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Bob Sheldon: This is Saturday the 6th of Au-
gust 2004, and I’m here in Manassas, Vir-
ginia for an interview with Hork Dimon.
Start by telling me your name and where
you were born.
Hork Dimon: I have a name I don’t use,
but everybody’s always known me as
Hork, which is from outer space. I was born
a couple of centuries ago in January 1930 in
Manhattan, New York City. At that time
my parents lived in Brooklyn Heights, but
not for long. They moved up to Westches-
ter County which is the county north of
New York City and I grew up in Westches-
ter County.
Bob Sheldon: What were your parents’
names?
Hork Dimon: My father was George Di-
mon. He was an economist and not math-
ematically inclined. He came from a family
of engineers and he didn’t cut it in engi-
neering. He went off to be an economist,
which was my worst subject in school. I
took Economics three times before I under-
stood it. No, I’m serious about that. I went
one year to Dartmouth and they gave me a
couple of percent to pass me. I then at-
tended the Naval Academy where I had a
course in Economics. The same textbook - it
was one of my worst grades in the Naval
Academy. It wasn’t until I went to the
Graduate School of Business out at the Uni-
versity of Chicago that it finally sunk in.
But anyway, my father was an economist
and worked down in the Wall Street dis-
trict. He was an editor of Financial World
Magazine. My mother was a nurse at Belle-
vue Hospital where I was born, and they
met on a blind date. She was Kathryn Sue
Smith at the time. Always went by Sue.
They got married in the famous Little
Church Around the Corner in downtown
Manhattan. They had me pretty quickly
and went home to Brooklyn Heights
briefly, and from there I grew up in
Westchester County.
Bob Sheldon: You went to school in
Westchester?
Hork Dimon: Yes, I went to a prep
school. It doesn’t exist anymore. I went to a
Lutheran prep school in Bronxville, New
York, called Concordia Prep. It’s now a
college. Then I went off to Dartmouth for
a year. I had the idea I was going to be a
lawyer, and maybe I should have been. I
had a pretty good record based on some of
the court martials that I did overseas when
they didn’t have enough lawyers. But I got
discouraged with that. I wasn’t sure what I
wanted to do. I was in the Naval Reserve
Officers Training Corps (NROTC). I liked
that, so I competed for one of the NROTC
slots at the Naval Academy. I won that and
so I went off to the Naval Academy. It was
a common curriculum in those days. The
only option you had was what language
you wanted to study.
Bob Sheldon:What class were you at the
Naval Academy?
Hork Dimon: I was with ‘52. The class of
the astronauts, and also a class that did
exceedingly well in stars. It was during a
period of about seven years when the Air
Force took in Naval Academy and Military
Academy graduates. This was because we
had an Air Force, but no Air Force Acad-
emy. The Air Force Academy wasn’t
founded until 1955 with first graduates in
1959. So the Air Force would commission
one-fourth of the West Point and Annapolis
grads at that time until around 1956, when
the Navy grew short on officers and said,
“We’re not going to do that anymore.” So
then the Army said the same. The Air Force
went without Academy graduates for a few
years until they got Colorado Springs roll-
ing. For years and years we’ve had to ex-
plain this, because people didn’t under-
stand how Naval Academy people wound
up in the Air Force. It certainly was inter-
esting because we did not get any kind of
indoctrination. It was easy for the West
Pointers because it was more like what they
were used to. But we didn’t know when to
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salute or when to take our hat off or put it on,
or anything else. No indoctrination.
Bob Sheldon: Did you draw straws for who
got to go to the Air Force?
Hork Dimon: Yes, in a sense. In January we
would all declare what our choice was. This
would be for submarines or for Navy flying or
Marine Corps or in the case of Air Force, Air
Force flying or Air Force ground. Whether you
passed the aviation physical dictated the latter,
of course. At that time the class was divided
into thirds academically. So whatever the quo-
tas were, they were divided evenly amongst
each third. The idea was that one-third of the
submarine quota would be filled from the top
third of the class, a third from the middle, and
a third from the bottom; and so would every
other quota. That came about in the Depression
when the only service whose size was consti-
tuted by law was the Marine Corps and every-
body wanted to be in the Marine Corps to get
job security. We were still doing it by thirds in
the early 1950s. Somewhere along the line they
stopped doing that. But back then you would
get a number, it was randomly drawn, and
declare your preference and then sit back and
hope you got what you wanted.
Fellows who went into, say Navy surface
warfare, that actually helped them. They’d post
the ship postings, and they would select what
ship they wanted and so forth. I forget what my
preference number was, but it was high enough
that when I elected Air Force flying, I got that.
More than one-fourth of the class wanted Air
Force, so there were a few that didn’t get it.
I think I was typical of those who went in
the Air Force as far as my reasons for going in.
First off, the Navy was still flying props and the
Air Force was in jets, and some of us had vin-
egar in our veins and wanted to go fly those
jets. Also, the Navy’s postgraduate program at
that time didn’t amount to much: an uncertified
facility there at the Naval Academy. The one
that they have out there in Monterey didn’t
exist in those days, or anything like it, whereas
the Air Force already had a very fine program
for college and postgraduate education. I think
most of us were pointing toward that as well.
And that’s exactly the way it worked out for
me. I went off and did my flying and had a
good time with that. I also went off and got two
graduate degrees, and for a while there was a
lot of overlap there. I did a lot of flying at the
same time I was manning a desk fulltime.
Bob Sheldon: You were at the Naval Acad-
emy when the Korean War was finishing up.
Did that impact your studies or motivation?
Hork Dimon: We were all hoping to get
through flight training while the war was still
on. The only ones in the class who really saw
much of the Korean War were the Marines.
After attending a leader’s course in Quantico,
they did. I had several classmates who got in-
volved in that. I know some were wounded. I
can’t recall if any of my classmates died in
Korea. But we graduated from flight training
right after the war was over, so the people in
my class did not get to fly in the Korean War.
Many of them flew in Vietnam and we lost
some in Vietnam, of course. I was scheduled to
go over there.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to flight
training?
Hork Dimon: I went to flight training first at
Spence Field in Moultrie, Georgia. The Air
Force at that time used civilian instructors and
civilian fields for all but one or two of their
primary flight training bases. And then off to
Foster Air Force Base in Victoria, Texas for my
jet training. Neither of those bases exist any-
more. After that, I was slated for fighter inter-
ceptors and came back to Moody Air Force Base
in Georgia for intensive instrument flight train-
ing. From there overseas to Iceland where I
flew with the 82nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron
and also served on the side as the General’s
aide.
Bob Sheldon: What aircraft did you fly in
Iceland?
Hork Dimon: That was the old machinegun
F-94. We trained in the rockets F-94, but we got
over there and had the old machinegun 94s and
discovered that we weren’t intended to do
much fighting. We figured if we intercepted an
airplane that shot us down, the war had started.
Quite literally. We spent our life intercepting all
kinds of traffic across the North Atlantic, and
navigation being what it was in those days, it
seemed like everybody was off their flight plan.
You would intercept all kinds of airliners and
everything else coming across, because they
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weren’t on flight plan. We had to check their
tail numbers. I met my wife over there.
The whole squadron came back in what
was a very ill-conceived notion. Someone came
up with the idea that they would - instead of
just replacing air crews a pair at a time, they
would move the whole squadron back to the
states and take another entire squadron - I
mean airplanes, people, desks, chairs - every-
thing, and move it over. It was crazy. We lost
two airplanes coming back. Of course, they
were flying west into the wind across the At-
lantic. I had to wait to return. I wasn’t involved
with that because, being the General’s aide, I
was held there after the squadron left for some
months. But that was the one and only time
they ever did anything like that. The squadron
was sent back to Presque Isle, Maine - way up
in the northern tip of Maine, up near where
Loring Air Force Base used to be. A little, tiny
fighter base which they re-opened. It’d been a
jumping-off place to Europe during World War
II. If you like minus 40° temperatures and feet
upon feet of snow, it’s great. It was something
else.
From there I went to AFIT, the Air Force
Institute of Technology, for a graduate degree
in engineering. I was at the resident school in
Dayton, Wright Patterson Air Force Base.
Bob Sheldon:What was your major at AFIT?
Hork Dimon: It was electronics. I hesitate to
say that because like many people who study
one thing, I wound up concentrating in another
field and never really accomplish much in the
study field. I came from AFIT back to Rome Air
Development Center in Rome, New York. I was
involved in communications equipment devel-
opment. I had picked up some sense of what a
bit and a baud were. It was the very beginning
of digital communications. Although I wasn’t
much on radio design, I did understand how
digits, bits and bauds worked. So that was the
niche I fell into. I did very well up there for an
Air Force captain. I rose to be a branch manager
who did some interesting work.
I was in charge of one of the very early
digital communications schemes. To spread the
communication band - split it up into sub-
bands, put digits on different bands according
to a scheme which would be unintelligible to
anybody listening to it, but could be reconsti-
tuted, with the proper coding, at the other end.
We were at the height of the Cold War. In
strategic communications, we were concerned
with getting the messages to either the missiles
or to the bombers when it had to be done under
very unfavorable conditions. That’s why they
were looking for schemes like some of the
spread-spectrum digital schemes. We did work
on that.
I spent a number of years arm wrestling
with SAC (Strategic Air Command) who saw
things a little bit differently than the people
from the technical world. We did some of the
very early communications equipment devel-
opment for Vietnam back when it was called
COIN, or counter-insurgency. Way back in
those days we were just starting satellite com-
munications, and I had a project in the passive
satellite field. Basic question, do we go passive
satellite or active satellite? Passive being you’d
bounce a signal off of something without re-
peating it. We demonstrated pretty well that
was not the way to go. Then one of the more
interesting things that we did - we developed
over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. We were not the
radar branch, but we discovered something in
communications frequencies, and we were see-
ing these strange phenomena on some of the
tests that we ran. And we said, “What in the
world is causing those doggone blips?” We
don’t understand that. So a guy came in one
morning and said, “It seems like every time
they shoot off something at Cape Canaveral, it
messes up our signals.” So we went back
through all the records and sure enough, it was
true. “But why is it that we experience some-
thing in our signal on the horizon when we’re
trying to communicate?” And we discovered
the back-scatter phenomenology and worked
on the over-the-horizon radar, which was what
they put to use to detect missile launches in the
Soviet Union back in those days. And to think
that we discovered the phenomenology simply
because it was messing up our communications
experiment and someone just happened to say
one day, “Let’s go back and see what that
means.” I mean, that’s how that started.
I went from there back to school, to the
University of Chicago, to the Graduate School
of Business. They had a special course up there
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for Air Force people in engineering manage-
ment.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of a program was
that?
Hork Dimon: We did not take marketing.
We did not take anything in finance, to go off
and be an investment banker. But we did study
economics, and they finally got through to me
on that. I took a lot of accounting, economic
theory, things like that. We had one professor
who got off some of the usual material and
taught how economics factors were used in
analysis. It was the beginning of what came to
be known as cost benefit analysis. As a matter
of fact, they had constructed a 12-month course
of what was usually a two-year program. They
did that by having us go through school four
straight quarters; no summer break. We took an
overload of courses, and we had to write a
master’s thesis. For my master’s thesis, I wrote
it in an area that could be termed Operations
Research methodology. I got interested in that
aspect.
Bob Sheldon: What was the title of your the-
sis?
Hork Dimon: I’m ashamed to admit, I don’t
recall, because after looking at the thesis several
years later – it was put in libraries, including
the library out at Headquarters (HQ) Air Force
Systems Command (AFSC) – when I discov-
ered it there a couple of years later and read it,
I thought it was pretty poor. (Laughing) It was
an application of linear programming. As I
said, I’d gotten interested in Operations Re-
search, such as it was in those days. I can’t
recall when schools started to have a formal
curriculum on that because at that time none of
them did. People just kind of fell into it. Of
course, there were the old submarine and
bomber studies in World War II but no one had
yet put together any formal curriculum. They
had a little unit in HQ AFSC, over at Andrews
Air Force Base, which was supporting some
work over there with Operational Analysis. I
wound up there after graduating out of Chi-
cago. We got involved in some studies of
MIRV, the Multiple Independent Re-entry Ve-
hicles – the value of putting more than one
warhead on a missile – and also did some stud-
ies in the bomber area and so forth. It was all on
the strategic side. So after the minimum of
thirty-six months there I had my name re-
quested by several shops in the Pentagon and
wound up over in the old Air Force Operations
Analysis (AFGOA), on the strategic side.
Bob Sheldon: Who was the commander
then?
Hork Dimon: At that time, that was on the
civilian side. We had Air Force SA (Studies and
Analysis), which was under military command.
And then there was AFGOA which was always
under civil servants, such as Carroll Zimmer-
man, but he was not the one who was there
when I first came. I worked for civilians there
who came in quick succession and left. Bergen
Suydam was my first immediate civilian boss.
He went off to go to the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Technical Cen-
ter in The Hague and they hired a fellow
named Gene Ray. He was a crackerjack physi-
cist. His name’s been in the newspapers lately
because about 1981 he formed Titan Corpora-
tion. What we started looking at was the fact
that all of the nuclear damage and effects stud-
ies in those days involved just blast and over-
pressure. They had this famous green book
where they had reduced some of the data from
the early tests before they had the Test Ban
Treaty. The nation was thinking of some sort of
a missile defense system. I think the first one
was called Sentinel and then Safeguard, or
maybe it was the other way around. But it
didn’t use blast or overpressure. Above the at-
mospheric the kill mechanism would have been
x-ray. If you missed on that one, you’d shoot
again and try to get it in the atmosphere with
neutrons. We didn’t have any model - any
study means of looking at that. So we said,
“What we need now is a model with other
nuclear effects in it besides just blast and over-
pressure.” So let’s go to work on that.
A bunch of physicists had started a little
outfit in La Jolla, California. In those days, you
would have people in the Pentagon who
wanted an answer overnight and they would
run models that the physicists said were inad-
equate. Then you had the physicists saying,
“Now if you wanted a model of a nuclear effect,
you’re going to run this.” It would run for a
couple of weeks and didn’t give the answers
fast enough. So they started this little outfit and
said, “We’re going to figure out how to do
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reputable modeling of nuclear effects that will
give quick answers to the people that need it.”
And that was the beginning of Science Appli-
cations International Corporation (SAIC). So
we put them on contract because they had good
technical people out there to start modeling
some of these effects. Another problem causing
models to run a week or two was the speed of
computers in those days. It was back in the
days of IBM punch cards. We started putting
together some other ideas, looking at some
other effects besides just neutrons and x-rays.
The notable one being the possibility that the
Soviet Union was targeting their missiles to
explode upon impact with the ground, or even
after going into the ground for a few feet. We
didn’t like this because the environmental dam-
age from that would be immense. It would
spread irradiated dirt over vast areas as the
wind would blow it all over the country, and
threaten the food supply and everything else.
There was another problem, too. If we tried
launching our missiles out through that stuff,
you might have a sandblasting effect if you
flew out through the dust cloud. So we took in
a fellow with a post Ph.D. to try to look at some
of the models of these dust clouds and to model
the results of the detailed models. It would run
overnight rather than for days.
The typical mushroom cloud that every-
body thinks of was deceiving. They had always
noticed that some of the photographs of those
things seemed to have these bright spots under
the umbrella portion of the mushroom cloud.
We found out the reason for that was very
small particles of either water or dirt where the
weapon was set off. So small you couldn’t see
them, but it was refracting light. In actuality,
not too long after a weapon would go off, you
would have a cylinder of dust or water vapor as
the case might be, most of which was invisible
to the eye. We would be in the position of
trying to retaliate and firing out through this
stuff, so the question was whether there was a
sandblasting effect, what happens to our mis-
sile when it tries to go out through these clouds.
We did some of the very early work on that and
demonstrated this problem.
Bob Sheldon: How could you tell whether
the quick-and-dirty models gave you answers
close to the longer-running models?
Hork Dimon: What we had as quick-and-
dirty still ran for hours. But they simply com-
pared results against the full-blown model -
they let it run full term and compared the re-
sults against what we got.
Bob Sheldon: How close were they? Within
10% or 20%?
Hork Dimon: In that region. You could not
go out to two or three sigma. I remember I
produced some curves and they wanted me to
redraw them as three sigma bands and I said,
“All right, the chart is solid black. You have to
accept the best estimates. It’s clear you’ve got a
problem when you can say there is a 70 or 80%
probability that you’ve got problems.” I briefed
the study up through the board structure.
First I had to go down and tell General
Glenn Kent about it. Of course, he was always
skeptical of everything. You know how he op-
erated. He said, “Take a piece of chalk, go to the
blackboard and start from first principle.” So I
did - with one-half mv-squared. From that, I
told him how we put the model together. He
had one of his people then take our model and
step it through one second at a time. We tried
half a second. We tried a second and a half to
see what difference we saw in the answers.
Although one second seemed arbitrary, it
turned out to be the right increment. But still to
run something in those days with models like
that, they still ran a couple of hours. He had one
of his guys do it by hand as another check on
what we did - and it matched. Recall General
Kent always wanted to be absolutely sure.
When it was all done, he had his own approach
to how presentations should be put together. So
we had to do a lot more computer runs to
satisfy him.
Then I went up completely through the
board structure with it. At the end, they
brought in the Commander of SAC and the
Commander of the Air Defense Command to
hear it. An awful lot of stars in the room. It was
in a briefing room in the Pentagon where you
have quadruple screening if you need it. It’s not
just a dual projection, but it had quadruple
projection and looked like a gym set back there
that sergeants would hop around on. So I pre-
sented the results there - that was the final step.
Going through all the board structure. They
brought in the major general who was running
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the Minuteman missile shop for the Air Force,
who had an excellent reputation for getting
things done on time and in budget. This was a
budget-breaker because this was going to be
like $300 million to fix the thing. Nobody pro-
grammed for this at all. He didn’t like the idea
one bit. I tried to see him, but he was one of
these generals who always had a phalanx of
colonels around him. Nobody got to see him
and I kept wanting to. I said, “He’s going to be
blindsided on this and he ought to know what
I have to say.” He wouldn’t do it. He sat there
next to me until it was my turn to get up. I
presented my analysis, and he was fit to be tied
because he and General Kent never got along.
At that time they were both two stars. The
truncation from two-star to three-star is quite
sharp. So the competition amongst the two-
stars is pretty intense. And he and General Kent
were always having it out.
Bob Sheldon: What was your rank?
Hork Dimon: I started in that office as a
major. I must have been a lieutenant colonel by
that time. That was towards the end of that
four-year tour in the Pentagon. It took us some
while to develop this model. We had over 20
nuclear effects by the time we were done. It was
very comprehensive and fell into wide use else-
where. I never will forget, when that last pre-
sentation was all done, General Kent stood up
and said, “That’s the best damned briefing I
have ever heard.” Having worked with General
Kent for a number of years, I felt pretty good.
My first experience with General Kent was an
interesting one that goes way back to my first
year at the HQAFSC before I moved over to the
Pentagon. He had two hats at that time. He split
his time between Andrews Air Force Base as a
Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) there and he also
had a position in the Pentagon. He was back
and forth. And he left our little unit over at
Systems Command with a task to do, and said,
“Come back in two weeks and let me know
what you find out.” They tasked us about 5:15
one day, and at 5:15 two weeks later we were
called in to brief him. That’s when I learned that
I had to leave the briefing on the table and take
chalk in hand. So I was up there trying to sneak
peeks at my papers on the table as I was trying
to describe and draw my curves. There was one
point there where I drew a curve and General
Kent asked, “What happens to the curve when
such and such happens?” And I said, “Well
then the curve would go up more.” “No, it
wouldn’t.”, he answered. My boss Lieutenant
Colonel Herbert Hoover started sliding under
the table and I, not knowing General Kent, said,
“Oh no sir, it would go up.” And my boss - - he
knew General Kent and I didn’t - - he was
getting real worried. So I explained why it
would go up and not down (I might have up
and down reversed in the story) – why it would
go the way I thought it would go and not the
way he thought it would go. Then he thought
for a second and said, “Well, you’re right.
That’s right. Go on.” And my boss came up
from underneath the table again. That was my
first experience with General Kent. The first one
fortunately worked out all right.
Returning to the nuclear effects model that
we put together, it was called OASIS. OASIS
stood for the OA Strategic Interaction Simula-
tor. That’s where we came up with the name
OASIS, OA (Operations Analysis) coming from
the symbol for our office AFGOA. We decided
that it was better than a lot of the work that was
being done elsewhere, and I tried to get the
people in Omaha to use it and didn’t get much
response out there at the beginning. Ultimately
we sold it. The Army defense people bought
into it, and pretty soon it became, not standard
throughout DoD, but very widely used, so we
were very proud.
Bob Sheldon: This was a quick-turn model
for nuclear effects?
Hork Dimon: It was. As I said, it still would
run for hours in those days, especially if you
put in the dust cloud part of it for a study
which involved impact on the ground and dust
clouds. I have no idea where all that stands
now.
At that point I’d been in Washington for
seven years, and they abolished OA in one of
these trim-down to bare staff exercises. General
Kent by that time made up his mind to bring
Dimon down to work for him because he’d
acquired some respect for the work I’d done.
There was a Colonel named Calafato who ar-
gued with him and said I’d been in Washington
too long. “If he has any chance at 0–6, we’ve
got to get him out in the field” and General
Kent acquiesced.
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I went out to Albuquerque. They’d started
something out there that hadn’t worked out.
That was to put in a little office which would
calculate the proper nuclear hardening levels
for various weapons systems that were coming
along. They realized the need to harden now at
this point in time for various nuclear effects,
but there was always a question how much.
Bob Sheldon: Were you in the test commu-
nity in Albuquerque?
Hork Dimon: No, I was in the weapons lab.
It was a very unique assignment. I was as-
signed to them. My efficiency report (ER) was
written there, but I actually worked for a board
of generals in the Pentagon. When we would
study a system and come up with nuclear hard-
ening that ought to be imposed on the require-
ments for that system, I had to come to that
board of generals at the Pentagon, and brief
them and convince them that that’s what had to
be laid on. For each such briefing, we would
bring in whatever general officer that the appli-
cable air command was involved, as well as the
head of the System Program Office (SPO) that
was working on that. Of course, the SPOs never
liked it because it meant money that was spent
that couldn’t be demonstrated because it didn’t
go bang. It was just money that was invisibly
spent. So before we ever presented that to the
Pentagon, I would go around and individually
brief various people who might raise great ob-
jections to any of it when it got to the board of
generals.
My first trip was memorable because the
trip was to SAC. That would have been about
the B-1. The captain that had worked the most
on it got up and started. He didn’t get many
sentences out of his mouth and the general,
who had a really tough reputation anyway,
jumped all over him. Well, I got up. I couldn’t
let him jump all over the guy. And, of course,
the SAC general is worried and says, “What
you’re doing is you’re tearing down the effec-
tiveness of my weapons system. I’m going to
lose out to the Navy again.” Because in those
days we had some real battles with the Navy
about putting Minuteman at sea, letting the
Navy take care of all of the missile portion of
deterrence. I had gotten very much into those
fights in the Pentagon, and some of them were
pretty bloody. I had to get pretty tough with the
Navy on some of them. Mind you, I was only a
lieutenant colonel. When my name came up to
join the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty) Team which was going to go over to
Finland, I was taken off as not being diplo-
matic. The answer came back from my office
that said the Soviets were nothing compared to
dealing with the U.S. Navy at this point. They
wouldn’t take me on the SALT Team. I did not
go to Finland. So I got up and I just told the
SAC general, “I understand exactly what
you’re talking about. I’ll give you a little of my
experience.” I told them what I had been fight-
ing for, and that I succeeded in a very impor-
tant study which literally threatened to kill
Minuteman if it had ever been bought. I saw
this simply by reading the assumptions that
they were going to put into the study and I
said, “Uh-oh - - our systems are in big trouble
here.” That’s when I went uninvited to a few
meetings down in the Pentagon basement and,
needless to say, we got into some pretty serious
arguments, but I won. So I told this to the
general and he sat back and let the captain do
his pitch. I said, “I’m here to protect you. I
know exactly what you’re fighting for. I’ve
done it.” So that worked out all right. We went
on to put together sets of required nuclear
hardening criteria for a number of weapons
systems. I got the procedure written into Air
Force regulation when I was out there and got
that process rolling. It had been underway for a
year, but hadn’t jelled until I got there to put it
together.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of hardening mea-
sures did you study?
Hork Dimon: It would depend on the sys-
tem, which ones would be the effective ones.
We would cover blast, overpressure, neutrons,
gammas, X-rays, all of them. Now you see,
x-rays would not pose much of a problem for a
bomber, but could for a satellite. Overpressure
would have no effect on a satellite. We’d look at
them all, but the ones that you’d have to worry
about would depend on the system. The
manned bomber would be different from a mis-
sile - for the manned bomber you’d have to
worry about the crew and how soon they
would get sick and become incapacitated - - the
amount of radiation that the crew members
could take. So we would look at all of them.
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Being the Weapons Lab, they had marvelous
nuclear effects models out there, often address-
ing just individual effects. They had one that
included all the radiation effects. I was there for
three years; and two years and eight months
after I arrived there, I got a call from the Chief
Scientist of the Air Force, “Would I like to go
over to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to a group in Paris, the Advisory
Group for Aerospace Research and Develop-
ment (AGARD).” They had a study outfit there
that had been underway for several years, and
they needed someone to go over there and re-
lieve the guy who was there and could conduct
those studies. He said, “Now think about this,
because we don’t have any bases in France. The
closest support is Belgium and Germany in that
respect.” We went - but they did have prob-
lems. A few of the people actually retired while
we were there in order to get out of the place. It
was hard. No language training, no base sup-
port. Nothing. But we loved it. I put together
these interdisciplinary teams. They were inter-
national. Usually we’d have US, UK, France,
and Germany. But occasionally we would get
Dutch and Norwegian, Danish and Italians. We
tried to get the other countries to take part too.
We would study various basic technologies
that were coming along and how they might
help us in the NATO battlefield. I had to learn
something about a rifle and a tank and those
things at that stage of the game.
Bob Sheldon: How many years were you
there?
Hork Dimon: I was there from 1974 to 1977.
Bob Sheldon: Do you remember any of the
specific new technologies coming out then?
Hork Dimon: You should have come over
here about twenty years ago. (Laughing)We did
a study on what the fighter aircraft in the year
2000 would look like.
Bob Sheldon: Did it look anything like the
F-15?
Hork Dimon: No. We were doing those
kinds of studies for a while, and then they
initiated a technology forecasting study that
had a two-sided effect. In other words, cause
and effect. The whole idea was to try to predict
what technology we’d have in the future, and
technologists would say, “That depends on
where the money is put. You put your money
into a certain area, that area’s going to develop
and produce something. So you can’t say
you’re going to have that unless somebody
thinks they have some use for it.” But the other
side is true, too. You can’t say that you’re going
to have some particular system capability some
number of years out unless there’s some work
on the technology. The chicken and the egg.
How do you bring those together? I had a pic-
ture I had drawn that showed a bridge being
built from both sides of a chasm simulta-
neously - technology progressing from one side
of the chasm and consistent requirements from
the other. It portrayed the process wherein the
systems people will be developing plans for the
future and will ask (as the NATO study request
did) what will we have in the future? And the
technologists will answer, “What are your re-
quirements in the future (for that’s where the
money will be spent)?” I worked to get them to
try to build this bridge over this impasse from
both ends at the same time, and they put to-
gether some teams, including some of the mil-
itary people - not just the scientists and engi-
neers - so that the bridge could be built
interactively from both sides of the impasse
chasm. So they get some of the military input
from NATO headquarters and from the nations
to say what the military requirements were so
that what the technologists predict would not
be done in isolation.
Bob Sheldon: Was the focus on the Fulda
Gap?
Hork Dimon: Always on that. The Soviet
strategy in those days was to have a plan, run
the plan, run it quickly. Their leadership prin-
ciples were different than ours. In our case, if
the colonel’s killed, the major would take over.
If he’s killed, the captain, and so on down to the
sergeant. The Soviet Army was rigidly locked
into its plan. The best way to disturb the plan is
to make it not work because there would be no
one around that could make any decisions. But
clearly their basic plan would be to come
through the Fulda Gap with massed armor, and
we would certainly look at that.
Bob Sheldon: How did you like working
with your allied counterparts?
Hork Dimon: I loved them. It used to be
funny. At the first meeting of any study you’d
bring in the Brits and the Americans and the
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French and the Germans. They would all sit
there and nobody would trust each other, and
everybody was always afraid. Their idea was,
I’m not supposed to say anything. These people
are only here to find out what I know. But then
I’m here to find out what they know. The first
meeting seldom accomplished anything except
to try to get these people to socialize, to get to
know each other and understand that there was
a mutual benefit to working together on these
things. Sometimes it wouldn’t work, if I didn’t
have the right mix. I remember one study
where we had a big overload of electronics
engineers (EEs) - - and the French had sent a
large number and we were totally lacking in
other disciplines. I had to ask France to send
fewer EEs and then ask all the countries to send
the needed disciplines. Those early meetings
were interesting. Then the study teammembers
would get to know each other and they’d go
out in the evening together and eat together
and then they’d start interfacing, on the side.
The studies were perhaps not nearly as impor-
tant as the connections and the friendships that
developed which went on for years and years
afterwards. Because these people then knew
somebody over on the other side and stayed in
touch.
Bob Sheldon: Which ones did you stay in
touch with?
Hork Dimon: I didn’t myself because I just
ran the meetings. I have very fond memories of
some of these people, however. This one Ger-
man chap who worked for me ended up years
later as the head of AGARD. I saw him a few
times subsequently. He spoke five languages.
Bob Sheldon: Who did you report to?
Hork Dimon: We did our studies for the
Military Committee at NATO. They were called
Military Committee Studies. The studies that
were proposed went to the Military Committee
for their selection as to what they wanted done
next, and, when completed, were briefed up at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We’d go up
there and brief them. So I was back and forth to
SHAPE and Brussels a good bit.
Bob Sheldon: Did your studies have an im-
pact on any decisions?
Hork Dimon: Since I left NATO, it’d be hard
for me to say except there certainly was one.
We’d had a problem with the nations in NATO,
all with different equipment, being able to
work together, communications being the pri-
mary bulk of the problem. When we got done
with that study, we started making some very
clear recommendations about what all the
countries should be doing with the view that
everybody would be able to work together on
the battlefield. I don’t know if it actually
worked out that way, but we’d like to think that
it was the initial study towards standardization
of key equipment in NATO so they could fight
together.
Bob Sheldon: Interoperability?
Hork Dimon: Interoperability issues, yes.
Whether that worked out I don’t know, because
I left there and came back to the States, and I
never went back. They wanted me out at DCS
Plans in Omaha. It was the Directorship that
had the analysis staff underneath it. It would
have been a very interesting post. But I wound
up back in SA in the Pentagon instead, and I
was there for about eighteen months and re-
tired.
Bob Sheldon: Who was the commander of
SA then?
Hork Dimon: At that time it was Jasper
Welch. As a matter of fact, he was the one that
I stopped in to see in the Pentagon before I
returned stateside and General Welch asked
where I was headed. I said, “I’m going out to
SAC.” He said, “What will you be doing?” I
told him. He asked, “You want to go to
Omaha?” I said, “Not really.” “Where would
you like to go?” I said, “I’d like to come right
back here.” He picked up the phone and called
Colonel Assignments and took care of that. So I
came back and I worked for him for about
eighteen months. Interestingly enough, I think
my biggest impact on SA at that time was not in
analysis, but rather in contracting. Back in the
R&D business, I had learned the hard knocks of
contracting. Dealing with contractors and get-
ting what was needed and writing statements
of work, and writing contracts that ensured you
got what you wanted. They were not doing that
in SA. They put me on a little group that was
supposed to approve the contracts that were
going out, and I just raised cane and got some
statements of work revamped. I learned that
Lieutenant Colonel John Friel (later Com-
mander of the Weapons Lab) had been trying to
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do that, but as a lieutenant colonel dealing with
colonels, he was happy that I came to SA. They
had to listen to me. But it had nothing to do
with the practice of OR.
I got into that again when I was in SAIC
because, in supporting the Navy, we would
draft major new contracts and I had to give the
facts of life to some of the people there at SAIC,
often admonishing, “No, you can’t say that.”
Then it became a mantra. They got tired of
hearing it. But you have to craft the words in a
contract so succinctly that if ever an issue goes
into court and they bring in lawyers making a
quarter of a million dollars a year to face some
kid in Civil Service who just came out of law
school representing the government, that the
government’s going to win. Look at it that way;
I’ve seen it happen.
I don’t care how nitpicky you get, that’s the
way you’ve got to do it if you want to make
sure it’s never going to go to court. I learned
that from my Development Center days, where
I was so unpopular whenever there would be
meetings and symposia, I did not get invita-
tions to the hospitality suites like everybody
else. That was simply for being just a first class
SOB on the government’s side of the contract.
I retired from SA. I went with SAIC, and
the first thing I did was operations research.
Jimmy Carter had cancelled the new bomber.
Even way back then the B-52 was older than a
lot of guys flying it, and this was just a terrible
thing. So we said, “We’re going to do a bomber
study that’s going to be different.” Three guys
who were doing this thing pulled me in on the
team to help them. Instead of just looking at the
initial nuclear Single Integrated Operational
Plan (SIOP) exchange, we developed some 532
different scenarios. Pre-SIOP and post-SIOP.
We had outlined about seven, eight or nine
different aircraft. Even brought in the F-111
people and said, “What could you do with a
stretch F-111?” We said, “Okay, we’ll take a
step forward in technology.” We had a concep-
tual bomber. We went two steps forward in
technology and came up with another concep-
tual bomber, and then examined how they
would all do in all of these various scenarios.
That study had several very important effects.
It turned out that we were the only ones who
had ever looked seriously at post-SIOP scenar-
ios. So you had the big nuclear exchange. Some
of your airplanes get home. Where do they
land? What do they do then? Is the war over?
Or is there something more to be done to win
it? We were certainly ahead of Omaha. They
hadn’t thought about that. And we had put all
of this into the study.
Bob Sheldon: Who was the sponsor of the
study?
Hork Dimon: It was a shop out at Wright
Patterson. They’re in the airplane business out
there. And of course, they were upset about the
new bomber being rejected, too. We were doing
it for them. We got the study injected into the
Air Force board structure, the Scientific Advi-
sory Panels and those sorts of groups, and then
over into the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Panels. In the end we saw some of our
mantras appear on the front page of newspa-
pers when the argument was accepted. What
was interesting to us is that, when they finally
came out with the specifications for the B-1, it
was what we called our Conceptual Bomber #1
– we were awfully close. Also SAC had gotten
wind of all this and they started thinking about
what would happen after the initial exchange.
Where would the airplanes land? How would
they do that? They started mapping off sections
of interstate for emergency landing strips and
so forth. How do you get fuel in the tankers and
all of that stuff? So it had two effects. We got a
bomber going, and we got SAC thinking about
what would happen after the initial exchange
when the aircraft got home. From that point on,
I left war analyses. The office was deeply en-
gaged in what is called IV&V, Independent
Verification and Validation, of software. The
Navy had a company that was developing the
software that would go into one of our missiles.
It was our job to make sure that the software
worked right, and that they got the answers
they’re supposed to get. And that it was sup-
posed to go out and hit the intended target - not
a schoolyard or something like that. So it was
very critical. The people who were using it
absolutely turned off the defense analysis part
of it, although enemy defense systems were a
very key part of the analysis. What can this
surface-to-air missile (SAM) or that SAM or the
other SAM or other anti-aircraft weapons do
against it? They said, “There’s no way that this
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SAM or that SAM is ever going to touch that
missile. No way. The modeling is no good.” So
they put me on it. This was a modeling prob-
lem. In OR you do so much modeling that I was
right at home with that. I started going in there,
and every week or two I’d turn out another
study demonstrating that under certain circum-
stances you’re going to get answers like this or
that. First, I looked at the SAM modeling and it
looked bad. Some of the modeling was based
on some things that had been done in Omaha. I
went out there and talked with them. And they
wouldn’t let me see the model. I didn’t have the
right clearance. I said, “Well, does it take care of
this?” “Yes.” “Does it take care of this?” “Yes.”
And finally I was asking, “Does it take care of
this?” “Oh yes.” And I was asking them things
that I knew nobody anywhere knew how to
model, so I knew I was not getting a straight
story. I came home and I said, “We’ve got to do
this ourselves.”
So we went to work to revamp the defense
part of that modeling, together with the Navy’s
contractor. In the end they said, “We’re just
going to start all over and completely re-do the
planning software.” Well now, that’s where we
got into the contracting stuff again - to rewrite
the contract on what needed to be done. And
that’s when I started resurrecting some of my
old mantras about specifications and state-
ments of work.
We couldn’t really test that. Our first oper-
ational test was really 1991 - first Gulf War. We
had a commander who was sent over there
temporarily from Norfolk who risked his career
to convince them that they should use this mis-
sile in the first strike. As I understand the story
- and this could be all incorrect hearsay, of
course - they said, “We’ll use it and when they
shoot at it, we’ll know where their defensive
placements are, and we can send in weapons to
destroy them.” Well, the missile went in there
and did that job along with other jobs. It made
believers overnight. Then, of course, we felt
very good - a success. But our contribution was
to make sure that the software worked, and it
worked great.
Since then, they’ve been in constant up-
grading and improvements on that. I wound up
Tech Director of that outfit. I wasn’t a computer
expert, but I understood what was going on
and I still got to work on anything mathemat-
ical or algorithmic so my old OR background
was still very valuable.
By the time I was President of MORS, I was
quite literally out of the OR business, which
explains why I really haven’t been active in
MORS since my presidency was over.
Bob Sheldon:When did your start in MORS?
Hork Dimon: The first symposium I went to
was down in the Norfolk area. I had been with
this little OR outfit over at HQ AFSC for just a
few months when I went to that symposium.
Then I remember the one in Seattle. I didn’t
attend one for several years - they were twice a
year in those days. Then I attended one out at
the Air Force Academy when a fellow named
Rod Clarke, who was an Air Force colonel, put
the bee on me to become more active in MORS.
I started attending regularly. I was nominated
to the Board, once or twice unsuccessfully, and
figured that was my fate. Then I missed one
MORSS because I’d been transferred to Paris to
that NATO assignment. I was literally on the
road at the time they had that MORSS. I think it
was at West Point. I passed through the Penta-
gon to take care of a few things on my way over
and bumped into someone with MORS, Clay-
ton Thomas. He said, “They elected you to the
Board and then regretted it.” I said, “Oh, I was
elected. Isn’t that nice?” He said, “Yes, then we
found out that you’re headed overseas for three
years; we won’t see you.” I said, “Well, I have
to see what I can do about that.” The bottom
line was that I didn’t miss a single Board meet-
ing - all six of them, those three years I was over
there. I made a point to come back for a staff
visit twice a year. Of course, that would be
sequential to MORSS and they would give me a
few more bucks to go on to MORSS at the same
time. The two-star in the Pentagon who had the
yea or nay decision on that didn’t really care for
it at all. He didn’t believe in symposia. But I
had a classmate who was working at Air Force
Research and Development (R&D) who would
go up there every six months and fall on his
sword and get it fixed up for me.
Bob Sheldon: Who was that classmate?
Hork Dimon: It was Colonel Dick Denfeld,
and he was not an OR analyst. His uncle had
been Chief of Naval Operations. When we
graduated from the Naval Academy, he went
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in the Air Force although Denfeld was a big
name in the Navy back in those days. But that’s
how we worked it. I’d come back, I’d spend a
week in the Pentagon briefing, de-briefing,
learning things, and then off to the MORSS
wherever it might be. So I had a perfect atten-
dance. It looked kind of funny on the roster of
the Board of Directors where it listed the direc-
tors’ organizations, and here I was in NATO,
but I got there.
Bob Sheldon: Did you present any papers at
the MORS Symposiums?
Hork Dimon: If I did, it would have been in
a working group. But as you noted on the chart,
I was on the Board for a stretch, then off of the
Board, then back on it.
Bob Sheldon: You were a third VP during
your first tour. What was your function?
Hork Dimon: When they created the Vice
President for Professional Affairs (VPPA), I was
the first one elected to that post. I spent a good
part of the year just defining what that VP
should do vis-a`-vis the other VPs because it
was obviously taking something from the other
VPs. Talking with the other VPs, we defined a
couple of things that were obvious. The Rist
Prize and some things were obvious, but not
everything was obvious. So we spent that year
helping to define what the VPPA would do.
Bob Sheldon: The Education Committee and
other things eventually fell in?
Hork Dimon: They eventually wound up
under there. The VPPA did expand. There were
things that wound up under there that didn’t
exist when we started. We put more emphasis
on education later on. I was off the Board for a
while, then I was elected back on. I went
through -it seemed like - all the positions. I was
never VP for Operations; that was the only
thing that I didn’t do.
You asked about a paper. Back in about
1981, I did submit a paper which won the Rist
Prize. It was given at only a General Session,
and it was based on work which I had done in
that bomber study. I got off on a tangent wor-
rying about how groups of aircraft could reas-
sign targets optimally if not all of them were
able to launch and proceed underway. They
would team up into groups, and if there were
communication problems, seven out of twelve,
for instance, might get there and the other five
would get lost along the way because they
didn’t get the word to continue. And how the
surviving bombers might, just there within line
of sight, retarget their respective targets to go
after the highest value targets assigned to the
original twelve. I had worked out this algo-
rithm, which even in those days could have
been readily programmed into a knee top cal-
culator to do that. So I developed that, and then
I sent a typical problem out to some guys who
had a big overall exchange model out in Den-
ver. I said, “How about running this through
for me and see if your answers come out like
mine.” And they did. So that was the proof in
the pudding. I presented the paper and won the
Rist Prize. If I remember right, that was be-
tween my tours on the Board of Directors. It
may have helped me get back on the Board. I
presented various papers to various working
groups at different times after that.
I had responsibility for audit of the Trea-
surer. The MORS office started getting dinged
by the OSD audit team. I said we ought to have
an internal audit, and we did some spot checks.
We had four guys who came in and helped
establish some rules for doing that, and that
turned out to be a good idea.
The election to the Presidency was an in-
teresting story. I was nominated and Ed Brady
was nominated. Ed Brady was Senior Vice Pres-
ident for MITRE; he ran MITRE’s Washington,
D.C. operation. Ed had a fantastic history in
MORS, things he had done. He was a very
smart guy and a very savvy manager. I was
running against him for President. They said
the vote was very close. Lo and behold, I won.
Bob Sheldon: Where were you working?
Hork Dimon: I was at SAIC at that time. This
was the symposium at the Air University. I
won. So I said, “Okay, I’m President. What
have we got?”
The planning cycle for the symposium was
two years. The facility, and I forget where it
was, that was going to host it the following
year, had just announced they couldn’t. So we
were without a site. The guy who was going to
be the Program Chairman, and who had done
practically nothing, was taking a new job and
he resigned. So we were half through the plan-
ning cycle, virtually nothing had been done. I
had no Program Chairman and no site at which
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to meet. What do we do? I thought, “Who is the
best guy to take over as Program Chairman?”
That was a job I had never done myself. I’d
done a lot of things with symposiums, but I’d
never been the overall Program Chairman. I
said, “We need a guy to do a two-year job in
one year, and the only guy I know of that could
do that would be Ed Brady.” Well, I’d just
defeated him for President, but I went to him
and said, “Ed, I’ve got a job for you.” And bless
his soul, he agreed to do it. I mean he could
have told me to buzz off under the circum-
stance, but he agreed to do it. And we went to
work. MORS had grown to the point by then
that we were limited in the number of places
we could hold a symposium of that size. We
finally got the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) to agree to do it.
As I said, thank goodness for Ed Brady. He
put together a great program. He always did a
fantastic program. We had another problem
that I inherited. When we went from two sym-
posia a year to one, we said, “We really ought
to do something more than just one symposium
a year now.” So that’s when we started a pro-
gram of mini-symposia, workshops, colloquia,
and some other things that we’d never done
before. The system at that time was that you
had to have a topic proposed by one of the
Sponsors, and then the other Sponsors had to
agree that it was okay, or a majority of them.
But this agreement process took time. Then you
had to find someone to chair the activity and do
all the rest of the work. Like a symposium on a
smaller scale. We had absolutely none of those
in queue. Here I was starting a year with noth-
ing planned for the fall. As I say, no symposium
site, no Program Chairman, no workshops, etc.,
in the queue. It was an interesting year.
We had a lunch with the Sponsors and the
Sponsors’ reps. I told them the problem with
these other activities. I said, “I need subjects
proposed and I need them quickly, because
we’ve got to float them by the others, then get
the Chairman’s approval. Please go home and
tell me what you want studied, and quick.”
Several of them did that and we put together a
program for the year right quick and got that
going again.
I thought everything was going along
pretty smoothly until in the spring, the DOD
announced that everyone was spending en-
tirely too much money on travel. All non-essen-
tial travel will be ceased. Well, meetings got
cancelled. Seminars got cancelled. And here we
were planning a large symposium out on the
west coast at NPS. I think that travel edict ex-
tended to contractors, too, if I’m not mistaken. I
know the contractors could shuffle with that,
but the Army, Navy, and Air Force had their
orders. I had to go around convincing people
this was really essential travel to go to MORSS.
That wasn’t the easiest thing. We were really
worried. What in the world is going to happen?
Are we going to have any attendance at all? We
were hoping to have a thousand. We did get, in
the end, about 800 despite the DOD edict and
we had a very successful symposium.
It was quite a year. Early in the year, we got
rid of the ambiguity as to what MORS stood
for. Up to that time MORS stood for both the
Military Operations Research Society and the
Military Operations Research Symposium. We
came up with the term of MORSS (for MORS
Symposium) and it was instantly accepted.
I was going to bring up the Dimon Algo-
rithm, but I don’t know if you are still using
that.
Bob Sheldon: We still are.
Hork Dimon: It seems that the first time that
it was used, was at a symposium I missed, so
that must have been the one at West Point.
Whoever ran the MORS office at that time, he
didn’t like the idea at all. Never did. And the
first time it was used, it went all the way down
to the last step - the coin flip.
Bob Sheldon: Was this Dick Wiles?
Hork Dimon: No. This was several years
before Wiles came on the scene. The Executive
Director, as he was called in those days, was
laughing. He thought they’d throw it out at that
point. As far as he was concerned it had failed,
but it was just the way it worked out. It went all
the way down to the final coin flip.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about the genesis of the
Dimon algorithm. What motivated you to de-
velop that in the first place?
Hork Dimon: Well, the reason was this. We
were spending an excessive amount of time on
elections. You would maybe have four open-
ings and 22 people nominated. The procedure
was you’d have all the nominating speeches,
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and you’d have a vote and you’d kick out the
bottom guy. Then you’d go through the whole
thing again to eliminate one more candidate - it
lasted all day. My idea was that when you had
a lot more nominees than you had openings;
instead of knocking off just one at a time,
wasn’t there some reasonable number more
than one that could be knocked off at a time to
speed this process up. That’s what was behind
the algorithm. I played around with it with
some hypothetical scenarios until I came up
with the Dimon Algorithm.
Bob Sheldon: Did you come up with this all
by yourself?
Hork Dimon: All by myself. Yes, and pro-
posed it.
Bob Sheldon: So the first time it was tried
was when you were not there.
Hork Dimon: The first time it was tried, they
did it, but when all was said and done, they
wound up with two guys at the end for the final
spot. Two guys at the end with a tie vote that
just remained a tie vote and had to go to the
coin flip. Nonetheless, we had spent so much
time on elections before that, and it did save
time obviously. You’d take a chunk of people
out at a time if you had a whole boatload of
nominees. But they kept it for as long as I was
with MORS.
Bob Sheldon: They’re still using it.
Hork Dimon: Well, good. You have a bunch
of analysts in MORS. I’ve tried that on some
other organizations and they wouldn’t touch it
with a nine-foot pole. (Laughing) No way. But
you have these people used to running with
algorithms and numbers, so MORS took it on.
I’m glad to hear it’s still going. Of all the things
I did with MORS, I think I’ll be remembered
most for the darned election algorithm. There’s
one other thing that I did that year, and I think
this was one of the more important things that
I accomplished. We had always wanted to get
OSD as a sponsor of MORS. We had Army,
Navy, Air Force. And they’d been unsuccessful
with that. I had been invited as the President of
MORS to something downtown. It had nothing
to do with MORS, but David Chu was there.
David Chu’s still in the Pentagon; I see his
name in the paper. He was Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) and I pulled him aside
and I talked to him about becoming a sponsor,
and why he ought to be a sponsor: his people
participated in MORS, and he could propose
topics for studies, and, by golly, he went with it
even though money was involved. It wasn’t
much, but still we asked the MORS Sponsors
for so many thousands a year as part of their
support.
Bob Sheldon: What were your selling points
to him?
Hork Dimon: OSD had an overriding inter-
est in analysis, not only did they do analyses
themselves, but they had to learn about the
analyses the Army, Navy and Air Force were
doing and whether they agreed or disagreed
with them. Their people did come to MORSS.
They had an input. And we had this program of
mini-symposia and workshops for which the
Sponsors could nominate subjects and get them
studied by a group of experts in those areas. He
would have the opportunity, as a Sponsor, to
suggest topics for the workshops.
Bob Sheldon: He bought that?
Hork Dimon: Bought it. PA&E became a
sponsor and I guess they still are.
Bob Sheldon: They still are.
Hork Dimon: That’s wonderful. We also
spent an awful lot of time at Board meetings
with the various reports. For my first Board
meeting I said, “Look, you’re going to have to
prepare this sooner or later. Let’s do it sooner.”
Send it out to everybody on the Board. Let them
read it before they come, then all we have to do
is discuss it. We don’t have to take time out to
hear all about it. And it really did speed up the
Board meetings.
Bob Sheldon: We call those read-aheads
now, and we send them out electronically.
Hork Dimon: Of course you have e-mail
now. But in those days we didn’t have that. Just
the fact I made them get the reports out ahead
of time, then it was just a matter of saying,
“Okay, you’ve read his report, you’ve studied
it.” And you just go directly to a discussion on
it. When we were all done, we went through
the whole agenda and we sat there and it was
only the middle of the afternoon and said,
“Well by golly, we’re all done. You can break
up if you want to or we can sit here and shoot
the breeze.” That had never happened before.
And I said I hope that they continue that be-
cause it was a time saver.
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Another claim to fame, I probably was the
only MORS President who had a meeting inter-
rupted by an earthquake. Now that’s not quite
like what it sounds. It was the symposium out
in Monterey at the end of my year. The Execu-
tive Council came out a day early and there we
were, on Sunday afternoon at a meeting room
that they gave us at the hotel, going through the
things that the Executive Council goes through.
Then all of a sudden about half the guys there
grabbed the edge of the table, eyes wide open.
“Did you feel that? Did you feel that?” And the
other half says, “What’s wrong with you
guys?” “That was an earthquake.” “I didn’t feel
any earthquake.” “No, that was an earthquake.
I felt a tremor.” In truth they’d had an earth-
quake in the hills north of Monterey. Just 24
hours before my wife and I had detoured over
those hills just to take a scenic drive. This one
little town we went through had gotten pretty
badly demolished. In Monterey, we were on the
very edge of it. So I said, “Why did some of us
feel it, and others not?” I took a poll. All those
who grabbed the table and felt something had
been through an earthquake, and they were
sensitive to it. Those of us who had never been
through an earthquake felt nothing. Anyway,
that was the only MORS meeting that I know of
that was interrupted by an earthquake.
Bob Sheldon: Who was your Executive Di-
rector when you were President of MORS?
Hork Dimon: When I was President it was
Dick Wiles. He’d been in office several years at
that time.
Bob Sheldon: Natalie was on board then,
too?
Hork Dimon: Natalie had always been on
board. She was there when I started, and she
was a Godsend. When we had the symposium
out in Monterey, everything went smoothly ex-
cept the security aspects of it. We went over
there the first morning and they had not set up
as we had expected them to be. We were de-
pending on several entrances that were
blocked. They hadn’t brought in enough
guards. And people were having a hard time
following directions to go where they were
supposed to go, and running into locked doors
and that sort of thing. Natalie grabbed every
key that she could find, and was busy running
around unlocking doors, checking people in
herself, and hollering for more guards. Natalie
got it sorted out, but I think we made a necklace
out of keys and gave her the “Order of the
Keys” after that. I mean that was Natalie. She
knew the operation inside and out, and she
knew exactly what had to be done, and took
care of it, and has been there ever since. They
keep giving her better and better titles, which is
fine. And of course, you now have more em-
ployees down at the MORS office.
Bob Sheldon: We have five now.
Hork Dimon: We went up to three during
my stint.
Bob Sheldon: Any of the other notable MOR-
Sians that you want to comment on?
Hork Dimon: Not just MORS, but the whole
profession. Clay Thomas and I were in the old
AFGOA together. I was in strategic studies and
he was over on the other side of it, but we knew
each other. Then when they eliminated AFGOA
and some people were sent to SA, we both did.
However my stint then in SA was just a few
months because I was on my way to the Weap-
ons Lab. He stayed and became Chief Scientist.
Clay was one of the pillars of Operations Re-
search from way back. He started soon after
World War II in an outfit at the University of
Chicago. Brilliant mathematical mind. I figured
Clay would never retire. He was forever having
exchange students at his house, and stayed in
touch with them afterwards.
He got a good salary at his level, but he
always drove old cars. To him as an analyst it
made no sense to put that much money into a
new car, and he would drive them until they
fell apart. I drove to a meeting down Interstate
95 with him once, and he drove along about 40
miles an hour in this old car of his. He was
quite a character. He had that raspy voice. And
it was always hard for me to understand him
because, like many pilots, I had grown partially
deaf. Still am. But he was a first-class character.
Jasper Welch. Of course a lot of people
knew him, but what a lot of people may not
know is that he wrote splendid poetry, which
was pretty impressive.
Wilbur Payne. You talk about characters.
We were on the Board together. I can’t remem-
ber if he was still on the Board when I was
President. He dressed any way he felt like. And
he’d walk into some General’s office and sit
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down and put his feet up on his desk. Just the
way he acted would get anyone else tossed out
on his ear, except that he was the guy for Army
analysis, and he got away with it. When the
Army put that analysis unit out at White Sands,
they put him in charge of that. But when you
saw Wilbur, there was no telling what he was
going to do. He was his own drummer, but he
was brilliant.
Something else comes to mind that hap-
pened in my first tour in MORS. Going back to
my three-year tour in Paris when I was on the
Board and how did I handle that? In those days,
the first year you were on the Board you were
on the Rist Prize committee. That was your
rookie assignment. So that took care of the first
year. Then what do they do with me the second
year? I’m too far away to get involved in any-
thing else, so I stayed on Rist Prize. I think then
the second and third year I was Chairman of
Rist Prize, and just worked on Rist Prize be-
cause I was so far away. Somewhere during the
second or third year, I got a call from the MORS
office. He noted that a lot of the papers I had
were classified and then said, “You’re going to
have to send all the classified papers back.” I
said, “I haven’t read them yet, and I have to
send them back?” He said, “We had an inspec-
tor through here and boy, he has gigged us bad
because you got those US classified papers over
there in a NATO safe.” I said, “No I don’t.” He
said, “Well, he assumed you did and you have
to send them back.” I said, “Like hell I am. Give
me his name and number.” So I got his name
and number. Now I wasn’t going to call him on
my nickel. I would go through the patch,
through the Embassy, because I’m not going to
have to pay for this call.
I had run into this very interesting retired
colonel when I was in Paris who would never
admit it, but seemed to be ex-CIA. One of the
things that he told me was that the phone sys-
tem there was really poor. I said, “Yes, I know.
It ranks behind those in some of the third world
African countries.” And it did. It was dreadful.
He said, “However, there’s one part of it that
works very well, so be careful.” I said, “What
do you mean?” He claimed that during the
German occupation the Gestapo installed a
phone tap system that the French never re-
moved and it worked very well. He said, “So be
careful what you say on the phone.” “Oh.”
Well, I’m calling this inspector guy up and
I’m patched through the Embassy (I had moved
into Embassy housing) which means there’s
attenuation along the lines to the U.S. And he
couldn’t hear me unless I yelled. So if the
French were listening, they got an earful. The
retired colonel had told me, “You can just as-
sume your phone’s probably tapped.” I don’t
know. I was in Embassy housing, so I don’t
know if it was or not, but I got this guy on the
phone and I said, “I’m not sending those back.”
He said, “You have to, you got them in a NATO
safe.” I said, “Mister, I’m a colonel in the Air
Force, you knew that.” “Yes.” “And you don’t
think that I would get to this position without
knowing that I don’t put U.S. classified in a
NATO safe? Couldn’t you assume that?” I said,
“They’re in a U.S. safe. The only two people
who can get into this safe in this outfit of mine
are two sergeants, both of whom are U.S. Air
Force. I have a U.S. safe up in my office and
they have a U.S. safe down in their office. And
there’s nobody in NATO that can get in those.”
“Well, I assumed . . .” “You should have as-
sumed that I knew better. You should have
assumed the opposite.” Oh, I reamed him out.
(Laughing) At the top of my lungs. So I was
permitted to keep the papers and review them
and continue as Chairman of the Rist Prize
committee. Then I called the MORS office. I
said, “My gosh, you should have told them
that. You could assume that I had them stored
properly.” Because the inspector had written a
gig against them (Laughing) for sending those
papers to NATO, because, you see, the organi-
zational address was AGARD hyphen NATO.
But the mail got picked up by American ser-
geants and put in my safe by American ser-
geants. I guess maybe it was a reasonable as-
sumption on that guy’s part but, boy, I didn’t
take too kindly to it.
Bob Sheldon: You said you retired from OR
and did some other work after you left the
MORS community.
Hork Dimon: That was the software IV&V
work that I got involved in. First, it was the
defense modeling in the mission planning soft-
ware for Tomahawk, which the users had
turned off because they swore it had to be
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wrong. I demonstrated that it was indeed bad.
From there on, they got me more and more
involved in the IV&V business. I’d done the
bomber study. That was behind me. That’s
when they said, “Let’s get Dimon over here to
check these models.” That’s how I started. In
the end, I wound up as tech director of that
outfit.
Nothing went out that I didn’t review. I
reviewed it foremost for cogency. If there was
something there I didn’t understand, I’d go to
the guy who was the technical expert and tell
him, “Explain this to me.” Then sometimes I’d
say, “Okay, that doesn’t come through the way
you’ve written this. Let’s explain that in here,
too.” That was part of my job. My father had
been a writer and editor in economics, and I
had a fantastic teacher in prep school in En-
glish, so my knowledge of grammar, punctua-
tion, etc., was light years ahead of the average
information technology (IT) troop. So I was
famous for my red pencil. I would correct
grammar, spelling, punctuation, everything
else, along with making sure that the report
made technical sense, had cogency, and
tracked. They said, “Nothing went out without
being Dimonized first.” That’s the term they
used. “It had to be Dimonized.” That kept me
pretty busy, because I had to review all the
technical reports that went out, which was a lot
of documents.
Bob Sheldon: Was this mainly supporting
the Navy on the Tomahawk?
Hork Dimon: Yes. We did other things in
that office that I was tangentially involved in,
and one I wasn’t involved in at all: bankers had
gotten paranoid over some of the ways they
were being ripped off. A favorite way was for
someone to get into some of the coding and
where something divided out to a fraction of a
cent, they’d send that fraction of a cent off to
their personal account. The transactions would
clear because the totals would balance. With
many accounts, those fractions would add up
and some of these guys were making big
money. So this big banking outfit in Boston had
an outfit in Texas completely rewrite their soft-
ware. Our job was to make sure the software
worked as it was supposed to. Also, when we
were done, it was our job to ensure that even
the people who wrote the software couldn’t get
back into it. That’s a firewall. Now we didn’t do
firewall work, but elsewhere in SAIC we had
firewall people who helped us. The financial
house was so paranoid that, unless you were
specifically working on that project, you didn’t
even know who the customer was. I tell you,
these bankers could teach other people some-
thing about security.
Nuclear power plant software was some-
thing else that we had to make absolutely sure
the software worked the way it’s supposed to.
We were getting into some Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) software work about the
time I retired. A neighboring office had bid on
one FAA contract earlier that they lost. It in-
volved some OR analysis so I had suggested
that they let me review the proposal and I did.
I went back to the VP and said, “This is not
answering the mail at all.” They sent it in any-
way, and they thought they were in a groove to
win it, but they didn’t. They said at the debrief
that it missed the point. It was as I said; it
needed to be rewritten.
They were getting into other FAA work,
and since then have gotten into it big time.
—You want to make sure the software works or
airplanes could collide. We bid on a NASA
IV&V contract. The people that were running it
and who constituted the review board of the
proposals changed while the proposals were
being written, and NASA simply went with the
low bidder. We did a little reverse mathematics
and figured out that the average employee of
the contract winner was making only $30,000 a
year and we warned, “They can’t do that kind
of work without more experienced higher paid
people.” And subsequently NASA had some
momentous goof-ups, for example, an interplan-
etary lander that crashed because they con-
fused feet and meters.
I used to take part in testing the Navy’s
software out at the factory. We’d go out there
and they’d run one of the tests, and I would
say, “All right now, how about doing this in-
stead?” because I had some inkling it would
fail, and most of the time it did. In time, the
Navy’s contractor instituted a standing rule not
to do anything that Dimon added; but then we
took the software and put it in our spaces and
tested it however we wanted to. Our job was to
see if we could break it, for that would mean
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there’s something that needs to be fixed. It was
more interesting work than you might think,
and it starts right at the beginning. Proper
IV&V starts with the writing of the specs and
extends initially to the first outlines of the cod-
ing. Before that, we would make sure that ev-
erything that was in the top specs could be
found in the lower level specs. That you could
track from top to bottom in the echelons, the
levels of specifications, to ensure that every-
thing was included that should be there. Every
requirement had to track back and forth, both
ways. That part of IV&V wasn’t much fun, but
we had to do it.
Bob Sheldon: Are you retired from SAIC
now?
Hork Dimon: Retired from SAIC. They
called me back - I was retired totally for about
four months. They invited me to join them on
an outing at a baseball game up in Baltimore.
Along about the seventh inning the Vice Pres-
ident turned to me and said, “Hork, how about
coming to work on Monday?” I said, “What?!”
And he said, “We’re into this Year 2000 (Y2K)
thing. OSD got its ears boxed when they went
over to Congress and they hired this GS-88
[slang for high-level civilian] to do the job and
we’re outlining for him how to do it, so he
doesn’t get his ears boxed again. We’re sup-
posed to have a report out for him on Friday
and we need your help.” So Monday morning I
showed up for work and helped them with this
thing. They hadn’t actually delivered it yet;
supposed to deliver it Friday afternoon. On
Thursday noon I was in the office all alone
because they had planned some kind of a lun-
cheon - I didn’t know that. I had brown bagged.
The phone rang; I answered it and it was this
guy’s office. “I’ve just been called over onto the
Hill. I need that report now.” I said “It’s not
done yet.” “Whatever you’ve got, fax it to me
now.” So I did. The other people got back from
lunch and I told them what happened. They all
crossed their fingers. And he went over there
and he followed it, and reported back to Con-
gress and sailed through just fine. So we were
off and running in the job of helping him.
The Y2K wasn’t the same as IV&V, but
there were obvious similarities. The company
headquarters called up my old office and said
we want you to put together a Y2K course for
the rest of the company and present it. My old
boss called me up and said, “I don’t have any-
body to put back on that, Hork. You’ve got to
do it.” So I put together the course and then, of
course, I had to go teach it. So I was pretty busy
through 1999.
One of the other things I did as Technical
Director was to do post-mortems on things that
didn’t work out. Whether they were just per-
sonnel problems, technical-whatever. They’d
had a couple of them they’d spent some money
on that didn’t work out, and these were in
proposal efforts and whatnot. They said,
“Come on back and tell us what the problem
was here.” That was strictly management. I did
a couple of those studies, and wrote those up.
The people I’m going around to talk to, almost
all of them still knew who I was and had seen
me in this capacity before.
The very last thing they ever called me back
on was - they needed some RMA calculations
done. Reliability, maintainability, availability.
We have a number of sub-systems working in
the system, and some of them are in parallel
and some of them are in series. We have these
numbers and what’s the final result, and that’s
too high. What do we need to do down here to
make the overall system values right? We went
around and around on that because they never
did get me all of the subsystem numbers that I
needed to calculate the overall system.
So I said, “All I can do now is make some
assumptions. For a particular system value for
which I lack two values, I’m going to vary the
two subsystem values and show you the re-
sults. Over here,” I said, “I’m missing three
subsystem values so there’s even more possi-
bilities.” So I calculated a number of possible
system values and gave them the results. None
of which was satisfactory as far as the system
RMA values were concerned. The Navy hadn’t
thought about the effect of subsystem RMA val-
ues on the system RMA until subsystem devel-
opment got too far down the line. So nobody
was happy. Then I wrote up in detail how I was
calculating these things. What the formulas
were. How you put them together. How you
handle the series. How you handle the sub-
systems in parallel and the number of parallel
subsystems that have to be simultaneously op-
erational, and whatnot. Because while I was
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sitting there waiting for them to give me some
numbers, I was busy typing explanations of
how to do this. Then they grabbed a mathema-
tician when they learned they didn’t have ac-
ceptable system RMA values, and gave him my
memos, and let him take it from there. And that
was the last thing they called me back on. That
suits me.
Bob Sheldon: What are you doing in your
retirement?
Hork Dimon: Everything under the sun. My
wife says why don’t I go back to work and earn
some money. (Laughing)
I did some analysis for the Manassas City
Council over whether the hospital would stay
independent or permit itself to be bought out
by one of these hospital chains. I also advised
them on Y2K preparedness. The Country nom-
inated me airport commissioner. So I’m an air-
port commissioner, which is more work than I
expected. It’s a nominal total payment; it’s not
really a salary. We have in Manassas the largest
general aviation airport in the state - the largest
of the sixty-two. It’s been interesting and puts
me back a little bit into aviation, although the
Manassas airport doesn’t run the same as an
Air Force base. There’s politics involved.
I worked at the Salvation Army for a while.
I was on the Board of the Symphony Orchestra.
I still work with the Manassas Community
Chorale representing them in the Chamber.
And I’m fairly active in Chamber work. I got
involved with the Rotary. The Rotary does
more work than most people understand, and
it’s mostly you have to raise some money and
then spend it in the right places in good works,
both local, national, and international. I’ve been
on the Board of the Rotary some years, and this
year I’m the President of the Rotary Club. So
I’m busy.
Bob Sheldon: Before we wrap up, any words
of advice to younger analysts?
Hork Dimon: For younger analysts, it’s a
matter of sticking to ethics. You get a study to
do, and the person who gives you the study
generally has very clear in his mind how he
wants it to come out, but you cannot pay any
attention to that. You have to make the study
initiator understand that you’ll be glad to do
the study for them, but you don’t know what
the outcome’s going to be; and whatever the
outcome is, is what you’re going to report.
Make sure that they understand that from the
beginning. Then go back and put in writing
everything that was said. Terms of reference,
the study, how it’s going to be done, what
assumptions are going to be made, and what
assumptions are not. Go back to the study ini-
tiator again and say, “This is what we agreed to
do.” Along the way, if it’s a long study, get
together with him in intermediate meetings. So
if it looks like the results might be different
than the study initiator hopes for, make him
understand that, because if he gets blindsided
at the final presentation, chaos is going to
evolve. But you’ve got to stick to your guns on
that, and it’s hard.
Just before I joined SAIC, they had been
hired to analyze something for a customer in
the southwest. The answer was pretty clear,
namely that whatever they were looking at
didn’t work. It’s not what the customer wanted
to hear. They were told to go back and rewrite
the final report. The company refused to do it
and they were fired. They were also excluded
from the next round of contracts. The company
stuck to its grounds and I think that’s the right
thing to do.
I remember at a MORS Symposium years
ago out at NPS, some guy was up there pro-
posing to do something silly like put ICBMs on
barges up north, and proposing an equally silly
idea of how to keep someone from sinking
these barges. I stood up and asked him, “This
assertion that these barges are going to be safer
and have greater survivability than our present
ground-based ICBMs— have you conducted
any sort of a study or analysis to demonstrate
that that would be true?” His answer came
back-I remember it clearly. He said, “Major” -
that’s where I was in life at that time-“Major,
rest assured that we will have such a study in
hand.” Of course, the whole place erupted in
laughter. But that’s exactly what not to do. It’s
not easy, especially if a firm is under contract to
someone and you know what they hope to get,
or if you’re in the military where someone se-
nior to you tells you what they want, and the
answer’s different. But the profession needs to
maintain that integrity, otherwise the profes-
sion is totally meaningless. Now you can go
back and do parametric excursions, and maybe
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give an excursion which moves the answer to-
ward what they want, but then you make it
very clear: you don’t get this kind of an answer
unless such-and-such value of input is some-
how changed. The assumptions that we’ve
made are such-and-so. And, “Sir, I’m sorry. In
today’s world, we can’t buy it for that little.” or
“It can’t go that fast.” You have to stick to your
guns.
When I started, OR was not a defined pro-
fession. I don’t think there was a school in the
country that taught an OR curriculum. People
argued over what Operations Research was.
The only definition at that time that they could
agree on was that Operations Research is what
Operations Researchers do, and they continued
to argue for years. I think during that period
everybody had his own little nuance in his
definition about what Operations Research
was. But it has been better defined now.
Schools have curricula. You can get degrees in
Operations Research. But the new chap needs
to remember that in those schools they will
learn methodologies, and not really learn Op-
erations Research. Those methodologies will
give them tools which give some kind of an
“optimum’ answer for whatever they’re doing,
but it’s not likely in itself to provide an answer.
You might use the tools or you may have a
study that doesn’t involve any of those tools.
The old World War II story about convoys,
which you may have heard, is an interesting
one. In World War II they figured the way that
we could reduce the number of our ships from
getting sunk was to sail them together and put
some destroyers around them and put them in
convoys to get the desperately needed supplies
across the Atlantic. And it is true. We mini-
mized the number of ships sunk. The problem
was re-worked after the war in different terms.
It was done where the proper criterion was
maximum amount of tonnage delivered and
when they analyzed it that way, the answer
wasn’t convoy at all, because convoys had to
move at the speed of the slowest ship. We’d
have lost more ships, but we would have ac-
complished the logistics problem better by de-
livering the supplies faster. Now, does a meth-
odology taught in a college tell you that? No.
That’s developing a sense of what it is you’re
really studying using as a goal what you really
want to accomplish. They originally minimized
the number of ships sunk rather than maximiz-
ing the amount of tonnage delivered to En-
gland per month.
I’ve worked with people who could do the
calculations if I told them exactly what to do.
Do this, do this, do this, and see how it comes
out. And they’d go do it. They had no idea how
to set up the problem in the first place, or what
it was they were trying to find. So a young OR
practitioner needs to recognize, needs to de-
velop, that sense, and not think just because
he’s taken all these courses in all these exotic
methodologies that he’s already an OR scien-
tist. He’s a technician. As I say all the time,
when he gets to the point where he is doing a
study for someone, stick to the ethics. Make
that person understand he’s going to get an
honest answer. You don’t know what it is. It
may be what he wants to see, and it may not be.
Bob Sheldon: Any parting shots?
Hork Dimon: It’s been a long time since I’ve
interfaced with MORS because I really did get
off into different work. However, my years of
experience in Operations Research have been of
value to me in everything I’ve done since, sim-
ply because it improves your thinking process.
It makes you at least look at all the assump-
tions, the pros, the cons, select the correct cri-
teria, and then analyze all the different courses
of action—no matter what you do for a living.
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